Summary of FGA, Inc. v. Giglio, 128 Nev. Adv. Op. 26 by Sendall, Brandon C.
Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law
Nevada Supreme Court Summaries Law Journals
6-14-2012
Summary of FGA, Inc. v. Giglio, 128 Nev. Adv. Op.
26
Brandon C. Sendall
Nevada Law Journal
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs
Part of the Torts Commons
This Case Summary is brought to you by Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law, an institutional repository administered by the Wiener-Rogers Law
Library at the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please contact david.mcclure@unlv.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sendall, Brandon C., "Summary of FGA, Inc. v. Giglio, 128 Nev. Adv. Op. 26" (2012). Nevada Supreme Court Summaries. Paper 172.
http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs/172
FGA, Inc. v. Giglio, 128 Nev. Adv. Op. 26 (June 14, 2012)
1
 
TORTS – NEGLIGENCE - PREMISES LIABILITY 
CIVIL PROCEDURE – GENERAL VERDICT RULE 
EVIDENCE – EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE 
 
Summary 
 
 The Court considered whether the “mode of operation” approach to premises liability, 
under which the plaintiff does not have to prove defendant’s knowledge of a particular hazardous 
condition if the plaintiff can prove that the nature of the defendant’s business tends to create a 
substantial risk of the type of harm the plaintiff suffered, extends beyond the self-service context 
to sit-down restaurants, and whether the district court abused its discretion in excluding certain 
evidence.  
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 Because the mode of operation approach is premised on the idea that business owners 
should be held responsible for the risks that their choice to have customers serve themselves 
creates, the Court concluded that the “mode of operation” approach to premises liability does not 
apply to “sit-down” restaurants.  
  
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 Respondent Debbie Giglio was on a date with Raymond Schefrel at Carmine’s Little Italy 
(“Carmine’s”), a “sit-down” restaurant.  Carmine’s was operated by appellant FGA, Inc., which 
was owned by appellants Carmine and Ann M. Vento Revocable Trust. The Trust was FGA’s 
landlord. 
 
Giglio and Schefrel consumed four beers and two glasses of wine at Carmine’s before 
Giglio fell on her way to the restroom.  Giglio claimed to have slipped on a greasy or oily 
substance.  Schefrel did not see the fall, but corroborated that there was an oily substance on the 
floor.  Managers for Carmine’s stated that the floor was clean and Giglio fell without slipping.  
Carmine’s surveillance cameras were inoperable the night in question.   
 
After the fall, Giglio had various medical procedures performed on her back and neck, 
and claimed future medical treatment would be needed in the future.  Giglio filed suit against 
FGA, Inc. and the Trust (collectively “FGA”), alleging negligence.   
 
Before trial, the general manager of Carmine’s incorrectly testified at a PMK deposition 
that FGA held a “nonrestricted” gaming license.  At trial, the district court took notice of Nevada 
Gaming Regulation 5.160, which requires entities with nonrestricted gaming licenses to maintain 
video surveillance.  However, the district court did not allow FGA to present evidence that FGA 
in fact held a “restricted” gaming license.   
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Giglio filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of her prior and subsequent accidents 
and injuries because they were not causally related to the injuries sustained in the accident, 
which the district court granted.  The district court also granted Giglio’s motion in limine to 
exclude evidence of her alcohol consumption on the night of the fall. 
 
At close of Giglio’s evidence, FGA moved for judgment as a matter of law under NRCP 
50(a), on the basis that the Trust, as mere landlord, could not be liable for the negligence of its 
tenant.  The motion was denied.  The jury was subsequently instructed that FGA was negligent if 
FGA or one of its employees (1) caused a foreign substance to be in the floor, (2) had actual or 
constructive notice of the substance and failed to remedy, or (3) that notice was established from 
a foreseeable condition based on the nature of the owner’s business, or mode of operation, such 
as self-service, under the “mode of operation” approach to premises liability.2  The mode of 
operation instruction was given over FGA’s objection.  The jury found FGA 51 percent 
negligent; however no interrogatories were given to the jury to indicate which theory of 
negligence it based its determination on.   FGA appealed.   
 
Discussion 
 
On appeal, FGA argued that (1) the district court abused its discretion by giving a mode 
of operation instruction in a case involving a sit-down restaurant; (2) the district court abused its 
discretion by excluding evidence of Giglio’s preexisting injuries, evidence of alcohol 
consumption, and evidence to clarify the applicability of a gaming regulation; and (3) the district 
court erred by denying the motion for judgment as a matter of law. 
 
Mode of Operation Jury Instruction 
 
A. General Verdict Rule 
 
 As a preliminary matter, the Court first determined that FGA’s mode of operation 
argument on appeal was not rendered moot by the general verdict rule.  The general verdict rule 
provides that if a jury renders a general verdict for one party, and no party requests 
interrogatories, an appellate court will presume that the jury found every issue in favor of the 
prevailing party.”3   
 
 In this case, the Court adopted the reasoning of the Connecticut courts and held that the 
general verdict rule is inapplicable in cases where overlapping factual theories support a single 
theory of recovery.  Therefore, although Giglio alleged alternate factual theories of negligent 
conduct, she raised only one theory of recovery—negligence.  The general verdict rule does not 
apply in situations where a jury renders a verdict on a single negligence claim that is premised on 
multiple factual theories, therefore FGA’s mode of operation argument was not moot on appeal.    
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B. Applicability of a “Mode of Operation”  Instruction 
 
  FGA argued on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by instructing the jury 
on mode of operation liability because mode of operation liability only applies in the context of 
self-service operations.  The Court reviewed the jury instruction for an abuse of discretion or 
judicial error.
5
 
 
 Traditionally, where a substance causing a slip and fall results from “the actions of 
persons other than the business or its employees, the business will only be liable if it had actual 
or constructive notice of the condition and failed to remedy it.”6  However, there is a modern 
trend toward modifying this traditional approach to premises liability to accommodate newer 
merchandising techniques, such as the shift from clerk-assisted to self-service operations.
7
  
Under the mode of operation approach, if a customer who is performing a task traditionally 
performed by employees negligently creates a hazardous condition, the owner is charged with 
creating this condition just as the owner would be charged with the responsibility for negligent 
acts of his employees because it was the owner’s choice of mode of operation that created the 
risk.
8
  
 
 The Supreme Court of Nevada implicitly adopted the mode of operation approach in 
Sprague, when it stated that even in the absence of constructive notice, a jury could conclude that 
a grocery store should have recognized the impossibility of keeping the produce section clean by 
sweeping alone.
9
  However, Sprague dealt with a self-service section in a supermarket; therefore, 
the Court did not address whether it would extend beyond self-service operations.   
 
In this case,the Court held that mode of operation liability does not generally extend 
beyond self-service operations to sit-down restaurants.  Therefore, the Court held that the district 
court abused its discretion by giving a mode of operation jury instruction in the context of a sit-
down restaurant.   
 
District Court Evidentiary Rulings 
 
 FGA argued that the district court erred by excluding evidence of Giglio’s preexisting 
injuries, evidence of Giglio’s alcohol consumption, and the potential applicability of gaming 
regulations to FGA.  The Court reviewed the district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of 
discretion.
10
 
 
 A. Preexisting Back Condition 
 
 FGA argued that the district court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of Giglio’s 
preexisting back condition.A preexisting injury may be relevant to the issues of causation and 
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damages in a personal injury action.
11
  However, in order for evidence of a preexisting injury to 
be admissible, a defendant must present by competent evidence a causal connection between the 
prior injury and the injury at issue.
12
  Further, unless it is readily apparent to a layperson, the 
defendant must generally produce expert testimony demonstrating the relationship between the 
prior injury and the injury complained of, and why it is relevant to a fact of consequence.
13
 
 
 In this case, none of FGA’s experts were able to testify to a reasonable degree of medical 
probability that her preexisting condition caused the injuries at issue.  Therefore, the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence of Giglio’s preexisting back condition 
because FGA’s expert testimony failed to meet the appropriate causation standard.   
 
 B. Alcohol Consumption 
 
 FGA argued that the district court erred by excluding evidence that Giglio and Schrefel 
consumed alcohol prior to Giglio’s fall.  Evidence of a party’s intoxication may be probative of 
the issues of comparative negligence and causation.
14
  However, evidence of intoxication should 
not be admitted if there is no causal link between the alleged intoxication and the injury.
15
  
 
 In this case, while there is conflicting testimony as to how many drinks Giglio consumed 
prior to the fall, there is no evidence that Giglio showed signs of intoxication in the accident 
report or medical records.  Because there was insufficient evidence to show Giglio was 
intoxicated at the time of the slip and fall, the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
excluding evidence of Giglio’s alcohol consumption.   
 
However, the Court determined that the district court abused its discretion in excluding 
evidence that Giglio’s key witness, Schrefel, consumed alcohol.   Evidence of Schrefel’s alcohol 
consumption was relevant to his ability to perceive the presence foreign substance on the floor 
and should be admitted to assist the jury in determining Shrefel’s reliability as an eyewitness.   
 
 C. Nevada Gaming Regulation 5.160 
 
 FGA argued that the district court erred by taking judicial notice of Nevada Gaming 
Regulation 5.160, which requires those establishments with a nonrestricted gaming license to 
have operational surveillance cameras.  FGA further argued that the district cour abused its 
discretion by permitting Giglio to present evidence of the regulation while not permitting FGA to 
present rebuttal evidence that the regulation did not apply to it because it only held a restricted 
gaming license.  
 
The general manager of Carmine’s incorrectly testified at a PMK deposition that FGA 
held a “nonrestricted” gaming license.  If true, this would have implicated FGA under Nevada 
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Gaming Regulation 5.160 which requires nonrestricted gaming licensees to maintain operable 
video surveillance.   
 
Generally, the nature and extent that a party may present evidence to correct or change 
testimony rests largely in the discretion of the district court.
16
  However, the Court stressed that 
the legal system has an interest in seeking the truth and encourages the correction of erroneous 
statements by a witness.
17
   
 
At trial, FGA informed the court that the manager’s testimony was incorrect, and offered 
both the testimony of the attorney who represented FGA before the Gaming Control Board and a 
fax from the Gaming Control Board indicating that the license in question was a “restricted” 
gaming license.  The district court excluded this evidence and only allowed the testimony of one 
of the holders of the license that the license was a restricted license. The court then permitted 
Giglio to argue that FGA’s witnesses lacked credibility because they contradicted the manager’s 
testimony and that there was no way to know what type of license FGA possesses because it was 
never produced.  The Court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in excluding 
FGA’s evidence indicating that it, in fact, had a restricted license.18   
 
Denial of the Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law for appellant Carmine Vento and 
Ann M. Vento Revocable Family Trust 
 
 FGA argued that the district court erred in denying its motion for judgment as a matter of 
law as to the Trust because the Trust, as a mere landlord, could not be held liable for physical 
harm caused by a dangerous condition on the premises.  The Court reviewed of the denial of the 
motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo.
19
   
 
Under Nevada law, a landlord is not liable for injury caused by the negligent actions of 
its tenant.
20
  However, a landlord is still subject to the standard duty to exercise reasonable care 
not to subject others to an unreasonable risk of harm.
21
  The Court determined that the Trust, like 
the landlord in Wright, was potentially liable for its own actions, but not liable solely based on its 
status as a landlord.   
 
In denying FGA’s motion for a judgment as a matter of law, the district court stated that 
it was the jury’s “decision to make a determination as to whether or not the way [Carmine’s] was 
set up from the mode of operation standpoint resulted in a potentially hazardous condition that 
the property owner and the business owner or the FGA is responsible for.”  However, because 
the Court held that the mode of operation approach does not apply in the sit-down restaurant 
context, the basis for the district court’s ruling was no longer valid. Therefore, the Court vacated 
the district court’s order denying judgment as a matter of law and remanded to the district court 
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for a determination whether Giglio presented sufficient evidence for the jury to find the Trust 
liable based on its own conduct. 
 
Conclusion 
 
  The Court concluded that the district court abused its discretion by giving a mode of 
operation jury instruction in the context of a sit-down restaurant.  The Court further concluded 
that the district court abused its discretion by excluding evidence of a witness’ alcohol 
consumption prior to a slip and fall and that the district court abused its discretion in excluding 
evidence to rectify incorrect deposition testimony.   Reversed and remanded. 
